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NRO review(s) completed.

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This U-2 capability can be utilized on short notice with a reaction time of approximately fifty hours anywhere in the world. The current improved version of the U-2 has an average survivability better than 92.5% over a single SAM site, even if it flies directly overhead, and a survivability of about 99.6% if attacked by MIG-21's. The actual mission survivability can be made even higher by programming the avoid SAM installations. Direct costs are approximately

\$15,000 per operational mission.

This program provides the U.S. Government with a low cost option for meeting future crisis situations in areas other than the more heavily defended areas of the Soviet Union. The vulnerability of satellites makes such an option especially desirable, particularly when it is recognized that neutralization of these vehicles would deny this country a high percentage of its strategic intelligence. During 25X1 non-crisis periods this asset is being used to collect ChiCom intelligence as well as to bolster political 25X1 relationships. All responsible U.S. officials feel that serious political repercussions and might adversely affect other important joint intelligence

projects. The program assets (airplanes, major equipment and

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. 1	facilities) are now paid for. The Agency program as now envisioned	
, , ,	is projected to cost approximately including NRO	
25X1	and CIA funds.	25X1
	4. Agency U-2R's have a mission altitude capability of	
	feet and a maximum range of at a speed of	5X1
	The standard camera configuration provides for a swath width of	
	63 n.m. with 2300 n.m. of coverage in the flight direction. They have	
25X1	a full complement of equipment	25X1
	capable of operating successfully	
	They are the only covert reconnaissance vehicles in	25X1
25X1	the NRO inventory. SAC aircraft of similar type do not now have	
	adequate	
[The SAC U-2's do not afford this	25X1
· ·	government the option of non-attributability.	
	5. It is the eminion of CIA that the applicability of the city	

It is the opinion of CIA that the availability of this flexible, quick reaction capability for covert reaction to world-wide crises more than justifies the cost of retention. It is recognized that broad U.S. policy considerations must govern U-2 operations and decisions, especially as far as overflights of China are concerned. And it is true that for the past few years we have been reluctant to allow overflights

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even with covert manned aircraft. However, it is important to note that in times of crisis our attitude in this regard can change rapidly. It is for such contingencies that a covert capability like the U-2 would become very important to the President. If we terminate this program

6. It is therefore recommended that Project IDEALIST be continued.

now, this option will be lost.

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